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ARGUMENT
I.

T H E ACCOUNTANTS A S K THE COURT TO TURN SUBSECTION
MEANINGLESS SURPLUSAGE.

(2)(a) INTO

At page 30 of his initial brief, Reynolds identified several decisions from this
Court1 that applied the rule of statutory construction requiring courts to interpret a statute
in a way that gives effect to each "word, phrase and clause" of the statute.
At the same page of his initial brief, Reynolds also identified and relied on a
decision from the Appellate Court of Illinois, Chestnut Corp. v. Pestine, Brinati, Gamer,
Ltd., 667 N.E.2d 543, 547 (111 Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied, 671 N.E.2d 727 (Table)
(111. Oct 02, 1996), that applied this rule of statutory construction to the 1986 Illinois
Statute that Reynolds discussed in his initial brief:
Defendants' reading of the statute also runs contrary to these principles of
statutory construction. If the second clause in subparagraph (2) of section
30.1 meant what defendants claim it means -that there can never be
liability unless a letter is written - then the first clause is trumped in all
cases and becomes meaningless surplusage. Under the Illinois law cited,
we decline to adopt the defendants' reading. A third party may state a
cause of action under the statute even though there is no writing, (emphasis
added)
After Reynolds filed his initial brief, this Court has reiterated this rule. In State v.
Phong Nguyen, 2012 UT 80, \ 18, 722 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 this Court emphasized the
"cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that we interpret statutes so that no part or
provision will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section
will not destroy another." (citations omitted).

1

Sindt v. Retirement Bd., 2007 UT 16, f 8, 157 P.3d 797; Faux v. Mickelsen, 725 P.2d
1372, 1374 (Utah 1986); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245,252 (Utah 1988).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Nowhere in their Appellees' Brief do the Accountants address this basic principle
of statutory construction, the opinions of this Court that Reynolds cited, or Chestnut's
express holding that courts should not construe language such as that contained in UTAH
CODE § 58-26a-602(2)(b) ("Subsection (2)(b)") in a way that would turn the language of
UTAH

CODE § 58-26a-602(2)(a) ("Subsection (2)(a)") into meaningless surplusage.
II.

A STATEMENT OF THE SPONSOR O F LEGISLATION I S EVIDENCE OF
LEGISLATIVE INTENT.

Rather than attempting to reconcile with this Court's precedent and the Chestnut
opinion the plain reality that their interpretation of Subsection (2)(b) eliminates
Subsection (2)(a) from UTAH CODE § 58-26a-602 ("Section 602"), the Accountants
instead take issue with Reynolds' use of legislative history in his initial brief.
In response to Reynolds' citation to Sen. John Valentine's statement during floor
debate, the Accountants make dismissive references to the irrelevance of statements by "a
legislator", an "individual legislator" and "one legislator". See Appellees' Brief at 24-25.
Sen. Valentine was, however, not simply "a legislator".

Rather, he was the

sponsor of 2000 Utah S.B. 226, which the Utah Legislature enacted as 2000 Utah Laws,
ch. 261, and which contains both Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) as part of Section 602.
Because Sen. Valentine was speaking as the sponsor of the Current Utah Statute,
his statement during floor debate that the enacting bill did not involve any "policy
change" to the then-existing 1990 Utah Statute is entitled to weight that is not afforded to
the words of "a [mere] legislator". See, e.g., State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, Tf 41,
153 P.3d 804, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah Jun 12, 2007); cf. Gottling v. P.R. Inc.,
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2002 UT 95, f 16, 61 P.3d 989; Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm Hughes &
Son, Inc., 782 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1989)
III.

T H E MEANING OF "INTENDED" F O R PURPOSES OF SUBSECTION

(2)(b).

In the words of Subsection (2)(b) the required intent is that "the professional
services performed on behalf of the client were intended to be relied upon by" Reynolds.
Although the Utah Certified Public Accountant Licensing Act codified at UTAH
CODE

§§ 58-26a-101 et seq. (the "Act") defines certain terms in sections 58-26a-102 and

incorporates additional definitions from UTAH CODE § 58-1-102, the Act does not define
"intend". The general statutory definitions contained in UTAH CODE § 68-3-12.5 also do
not define "intend". In the absence of any statutory definition, it is appropriate to resort
to common-law definitions of a word. Cf. In re Fenner's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 134, 139, 270
P.2d 449, 452 (1954); UTAH CODE § 68-3-11 ("Words and phrases are to be construed
according to the context and the approved usage of the language;...").
In Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017, 1023 (1921)
this Court acknowledged that "every man must be held to intend the natural and probable
consequence of his deeds."
More recently, in Wagner v. State, 2005 UT 54,fflf22, 25-26, 122 P.3d 599 this
Court employed a definition of "intent" that requires that a battery defendant either (i)
desired to cause certain consequences, or (ii) believed that those consequences were
substantially likely to result from defendant's aclibns;1

:

-'••*"

:

?

Then, in Helfv. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, If 43, 203 P.3d 962, this Court
held that a workers' compensation defendant "intended" an employee's injuries if the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,
- 3 - may contain errors.

defendant/employer "knew or expected" that its actions would injure the employee.
Therefore, under Subsection (b)(2) the Accountants "intended" Reynolds' reliance
on the Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice if the Accountants (i)
desired that Reynolds rely on the professional services that the Accountants' provided to
Altaview, (ii) believed that Reynolds' reliance on the Accountants' work for Altaview
was substantially likely to result, or (iii) knew or expected that Reynolds would rely on
the professional services that the Accountants provided to Altaview.
Additionally, the "approved usage of the language" that UTAH CODE § 68-3-11
directs Utah courts to apply is consistent with these definitions of "intend". See, e.g.,
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

881 (9th ed. 2009) (alternatively defining "intend" as "[t]o

contemplate that the usual consequences of one's act will probably or necessarily follow
from the act, whether or not those consequences are desired for their own sake...."
IV.

SUBSECTION (2)(b) DOES N O T REQUIRE T H E ACCOUNTANTS' INTENT TO
APPEAR IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT.

The Accountants argued below that "[a]n accountant is liable to a non-client under
the near privity exception only when the accountant provides the client with a writing
that meets the requirements of subsection (2)(b)."

(R. 199) (emphasis added). The

Accountants repeat this argument at page 16 of their Appellees' Brief, where they write:

..

The plain language of the near privity exception to the privity of contract
rule allows an accountant to extend its potential liability to a non-client
only if the accountant and client both intend for a particular non-client to
rely on the professional services the accountant provided to the client, and
the accountant sent its client a writing stating that the accountant intended
for the particular non-client to rely on the professional services the
accountant performed for the client.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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never been able to identify a single }vriting from the Accountants to Altaview which
stated that the Accountants intended for Reynolds to rely on the professional services the
A a militants peiitumeil Im

\n,i\iin

Insii'id i(niiol«IU submittal <i iiiinJiiiiasli nf

documents which he claimed satisfied subsection (2)(b).")
Throughout their Appellees' Brief, the Accountants repeat their theme of "a" or
"the' writing in an effort, to create the perception that only a single document can sat isfy

Accountants' reading of Subsection (2)(b), that the requisite "intent" requires a single,
unitary document. In fact, Utah law is the opposite of the Accountants' position.
Al page 4} ol' his iiiutuill hurl, IM yields' disnr-

!

-

tr-^

,s

--

r*

establishing that when multiple documents are substantially contemporaneous or
exchanged as part of the same transaction and are clearly interrelated or concern the same
subfal mallt'i., < nmis t nnsimr (liPiti as -i \\UoW aiiil harmonize their meanings if possible,
even if the documents do not refer to one another

The ^\ ccoi intants ignore those

opinions in their argument that their intent must appear in a single document.
E\ en under the formidable strictures 01 utaii s Mah.-k . i Frauds, several writings
sharing a common nexus may be construed fopdhii is - nnlmmnj! i'l 'I

PIIII,

\\\ .

contract, notwithstanding the fact they are not all signed by the party whose intent is at
issue, See Gregersonv. Jensen, 61 7 P.2( 1 369, 3 1 2 73 (I J tah 1980),

2

Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 109 (Utan .
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 267, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972)

- ':'" ••

-'':' - -

dullfrog Marina, Inc. i\

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Gregerson arose under UTAH CODE § 25-5-1, the section of the Utah Statute of
Frauds that requires that all estates or interests in real property be "in writing". See id. at
372. More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied Gregerson in concluding that
multiple documents can properly be read together to satisfy UTAH CODE § 25-5-3 (2007),
the section of the Utah Statute of Frauds that requires that all leases and contracts for
interests in real property be "in writing". See Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, f 22,
234 P.3d 1156, cert, denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah Sep 27, 2010). Following Gregerson,
the Wilson court held that when a contract is expressed in multiple documents, even
where some of the documents are unsigned, the statute of frauds is met when the signed
writings expressly reference the unsigned writings.
When the "in writing" language of the Statute of Frauds can be satisfied by several
signed documents along with unsigned documents that the signed documents reference, it
is difficult to see why the "in writing" language of Subsection (2)(b) should mean
something different.

Nothing in Subsection (2)(b) requires that the Accountants'

intention be expressed in a single document and the Accountants offer no explanation or
justification for their argument that it does.
The absence from Subsection (2)(b) of any requirement that the Accountants'
intention appear in a single document prevents the inference of such a restriction into the
statute: "[W]e will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there.
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and we have no power:t&\-: •:: : ,;
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." I.M.L. v. State, 2002 UT
110, U 25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(2)(b) contains any requirement that their intention for Reynolds to ivly on the
Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice must appear in a single document.
V.

1

SUBSECTION(2)(b)DOES l\lor KKgriKi' I in \ u tM<NI AN I* I N I V M • 11>
B E EXPRESSLY STATED,

The Accountants further assert without analysis or support that the trier of fact
may not properly infer the Accountants' intent because such an inference "would
effectively nullif) the w riting i equii ement :)f the nea t: pi i\ it) exception "'

appellees'

Brief at 19-20. According to the Accountants, "the writing requirement

*i'."^n

(2)(b) would become meaningless if it can be satisfied by a jin\ finding by inference
from one or more documents that an accountant intended that a non-client rely on the
accountant's worl

•

'

-untants 1 n ge th is coi ir I: t :) hold that the

required writing "must expressly state that the accountant intended for a particular nonclient to rely on the accountant's work." Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
H o w n n , |iisl \v\ Siilva'uion (,M(hi s;r\s ii<iliiiiii« «ilM>LH .1 single ijot'i 11 111 11 ilso
does not require an "express statement" of intent. The Accountants provide no hi - I'm
this claimed requirement, and the LM.I. decision that Reynolds discusses above makes
clciiii (li ml ill UIIMMIK imprnpi I In en^nil! JIH/II 1 suhstunliu llci u» (111(0 subsection (2)(b).
As is the case with the Accountants' "single-document

>••:•. *k'

expressly state" argument is also contrary to Utah law, demanding a.s it . »

^ ,ai the

C011 11 t 1 ead iiitc Si lbsection (2)(b) a limitation on Reynolds' cause of action against the
Accountants that is not contained in 1 he language of Subsection (2)(b).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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VI.

SUBSECTION (2)(b) DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE JURY FROM INFERRING
THE ACCOUNTANTS'INTENT.

Inferences are a common and necessary tool in resolving legal disputes because
[t]he nature of the world about us and the goings on therein are such that
we witness only a small percentage of it by direct observation. A large
portion of our awareness and knowledge is necessarily derived from
deductions based upon our observations of existing facts and
circumstances. It is important to apply this principle to the prerogative of
the court as the fact trier. He is entitled to make his findings of fact, not
only on evidence concerning direct observations, but also to draw whatever
inferences a person of ordinary intelligence and experience could fairly and
reasonably draw therefrom.
Morris v. Farmers Home Mut, Ins, Co,, 28 Utah 2d 206, 209, 500 P.2d 505, 507 (1972)
(emphasis added).
The Morris opinion later returned to the "prerogative" of the trier of fact when it
referred to the "traditional rules which allow the trial court the prerogative not only of
finding the facts shown by the direct evidence, but also of drawing any reasonable
deductions and inferences that could fairly and reasonably be derived therefrom." Id, at
507-08.
The "inference" that this Court has held the trier of fact has the prerogative to
make is
a logical and reasonable conclusion of the existence of a fact in the case,
not presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the fact itself, but
inferred from the establishment of other facts from which, by the process of
logic and reason, based upon common experience, the existence of the
assumed fact may be concluded by the trier of the fact.
Wyatt v. Baughman, 121 Utah 98, 109, 239 P.2d 193, 198 (1951)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A 11(1 the law "requires" that a tt ial coi 11 t pe i oill: the ji i:n to \ ' • elgli inferences along
with the evidence presented in the case to contravene the inference. See id. at 199.
In only the past five years IJtah appellate courts have identified numerous

e.g., Stern v. Metropolitan

Water Dist. of Salt Lake & Sandy, 2012 U 1 16. fft t j , 4 ? , i / 4

P.3d 935 (inference of intent that a covenant run with the land); Anderson

\, Knser. 201 1

I r 1' hh, ll| lu, Jhb i" M I N I"''" | ) raudulent intent is often inferred based on the totality of the
circumstances in a case."); Christensen

& Jetisi //, P ('

^ / n v / z - l 1 Daincs. .*'i' K)K I I I M ,

f 47, 194 P.3d 931 (inference that the attorneys in different law firms intended to divide
the fees in proportion to the services performer

lawyer); Ellsworth

Paulsen

Con st G ) i > 5 ! SI:) R I I C ,

-

share losses); Wilson v. Johmun,

201U w 1 App 137, *]j 22 (inference o f intent regarding

MS (inlVreiu r ^\( inlrnl t

purchase price increase).
VII

INTENT IS A QUESTION OF I"1 vm i 1^ >i< i IIK ,IHK V ,«I,I" m is INAPPROPRIATE
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

However, the fact that the trier of fact (in this case, a jury) is required when
necessary to infer intent at tiial does not permit a trial court to infer intent - as the trial
court did in ti "<? - in.se

in con nection

1/1:1:1. a si immai ;; ji ldgment motion

In Wit s : n i

Johnson, 2010 l!T \ p p 137 ? ][ 22, the trial court inferred intent in the process of resolving
a summary judgment motion where intent was disputed. T V T u h Tourf

f Appeal:,

reversed 1 he trial : • :)i , t: It I )ecai lse ft ictual dispi i1 es i ibe r ill: par t ies' ' intent cannot b e res( i. v\.
by summary judgment.
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In this case, the Accountants themselves have identified the following undisputed
facts that could permit the jury to infer at trial that the Accountants intended that
Reynolds would rely on the Accountants' professional services:
•

Reynolds was both the president and the sole equity owner of the Altaview
Companies, the Accountants' clients. (Appellees' Brief at 6);

•

Because the Altaview Companies were pass-through companies, the
Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice "unavoidably
related to Reynolds." (Appellees' Brief at 31);

•

The Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice included
reviewing estimated taxes and net proceeds from the sale of Altaview that
"would ultimately flow through to Reynolds." (Appellees' Brief at 31);

•

Reynolds "would ultimately be responsible for taxes on the sale of the
Altaview companies." (Appellees' Brief at 32);

•

The Accountants drafted the engagement letter which Altaview signed as
the Accountants drafted it.3 (Appellees' Brief at 7-8 & Exhibit 1); and

•

The Accountants "knew that a primary intent of Altaview was to have the
Accountants' professional services benefit or influence Reynolds."
(Appellees' Brief at 10, 16).4

3

At page 32 of their Appellees' Brief, the Accountants make the curious assertion that
Reynolds claims to be "the true intended beneficiary" of the engagement letter between
Tanner and Altaview. Reynolds has never taken the position before the trial court or on
appeal that he was a "beneficiary" of that agreement, intended or otherwise. Indeed, the
word "beneficiary" never appears in Reynolds' initial brief on appeal. Reynolds'
position has consistently been that nothing in Section 602 bars his claims against the
Accountants because the Accountants intended Reynolds' reliance on the Accountants'
tax and transactional services and advice at all times during the engagement that followed
execution of the engagement letter that the Accountants drafted.
4

At page 29 of their Appellees' Brief, the Accountants make the unremarkable
observation that "[i]f reasonable jurors, properly instructed, would be able to come to
only one conclusion there is no genuine issue of material fact." The Accountants fail,
however, to analyze this concept or to show how in light of these undisputed facts
reasonable jurors could only conclude that the Accountants did not intend that Reynolds
would rely on the Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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At pages 46-48 of his initial brief, Reynolds discussed numerous undisputed and
competent documents from which the jury could infer that the Accountants intended that
Reynolds would be influenced by, and would rely on, the Accountants' tax and
transactional services and advice.
Two particular documents highlight the Accountants' intention:
•

In an e-mail Ben Covington asked Bickel to confirm that (i) Reynolds
would be personally liable for the Altaview Companies' taxes, and (ii) the
Altaview Companies should include income as a basis for Reynolds' stock
based on the assumption that Reynolds' proceeds from the closing would
be used to pay the Altaview Companies' tax liability. Bickel responded to
both of these questions regarding Reynolds' personal tax liability: "You are
correct on both points." (R. 295-96, 436, 595-86 (Add. B to Reynolds'
initial brief))

•

On October 28, 2010, Bickel wrote in an e-mail: "I was reviewing the
spreadsheet and I think we may have inadvertently excluded from Scott's
proceeds the distribution of the installment note, which potentially changes
the tax quite a bit." (R. 5, 21, 122, 124, 191, 235, 237 (Add. B to Reynolds'
initial brief), 321-23)) (emphasis added)5

In Winegar v. Froerer Corp,, 813 P.2d 104, 111 (Utah 1991) this Court reversed a
trial court's determination of intent as part of its ruling on a summary judgment motion:
[Wjeighing evidence is proper only when making findings of fact, not when
determining questions of law in interpreting a contract on a motion for
summary judgment. There is sufficient ambiguity regarding the intentions
of the parties to this transaction that the trial court could not properly
resolve this action in the Winegars' favor as a matter of law. We therefore
reverse and remand this case for trial on the issue of intent.

5

At page 9 of their Appellees' Brief, the" Accountants paraphrase the contents of this email so as to remove its express references to Reynolds and to Reynolds' personal tax
liability: "In late October, 2010, while reviewing one of Covington's spreadsheets, Bickel
realized that it did not include the principal amount of an installment note as an asset that
was distributed at closing."
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See also, Ellsworth Paulsen Const, 2008 UT 28, f 19 (improper to infer on summary
judgment whether contracting parties intended to share losses).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should REVERSE the trial court's summary
judgment that the Accountants did not indicate in writing that the Accountants intended
for Reynolds to rely on the Accountants' tax and transactional services and advice.
DATED: January 23, 2013
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH, p.c.

By: J

A

igus Edwards
R. L. Knuth
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, R. Scott Reynolds
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